1 This essay is based on a talk presented at the Berkshire Conference, June 2011. I would like to thank Anjali Arondekar for inviting me to the panel she organized and for her critical comments on my presentation piece. The sentiment that informed this question was the familiar desire for "being the same" as the ground for work of solidarity. I say familiar because this was indeed a central desire in second-wave feminism, both informing its campaigns in the US and its relation to the struggles of women's rights activists globally as expressed in two of its most famous slogans: Sisterhood is Powerful and Sisterhood is Global. I emphasize both in the US and on the transnational scene, because I do not think this, like many other issues that we habitually categorize thus, is a West/non-West divide.
Since the 1970s, the power of, but more importantly the problems associated with, this desire have been at great length discussed in critical feminist debates. In particular, Janet Jakobsen incisively analyzed the effects of what she aptly called an "economy of the same" on the constitution of politics of singularity within feminist movements in the 1970s through the 1990s in the United States. 4 Similarly, Denise Riley has critiqued the invocation of identification as grounds for solidarity, "For solidarity can veer between progressive warmth, pious constraint, narrowly tactical calculation, imaginative generosity, and unwarranted familiarity." 5 It seems to me that the sentiment expressed in that question, and in how international campaigns on behalf of gender and sexual justice insist on naming the people with whom they desire to solidarize, works within the terms of the economy of the same and fails to reflect over what effects its familiarization of those young men in Mashhad by naming them gay produce.
While the working of this economy of the same enables international gay rights activists to name some people in Iran (and elsewhere) as gay and work in defense of their rights, this sameness is embedded within a progress narrative that imagines "their situation back
in Iran" as a time past of gays here. This temporalization anticipates that the future of "gays in Iran" will and ought to look like "our present," that is, their situation will improve, as they will acquire rights in a more or less similar trajectory of political and cultural emergences. It produces the difference between them and us as a catching up operation that deserves international attention and solidarity, and grounds the moral imperative to come to the aid of our less fortunate gay brothers (sisters are occasionally included).
If these questions have been under critical scrutiny and analysis for more than two decades, how do we understand the persistent desire to do transnational solidarity work within an "economy of the same"? Furthermore, what accounts for the continued weight of the West/non-West divide and of the competitive comparativist urge across that divide --whether we are asking questions about genealogies, histories, or about the politics of the struggles and possibilities of solidarities --to the shaping of our dialogue today? 6 I suspect there is no single or simple answer to this question. I will pursue one line of speculation here: that the long enduring life of the desire for the same, for familiarity even if unwarranted, is linked with another concept with equally (and related) long life.
While there are important distinctions between the feminist desire and that of gay rights activists, both reference that troubling concept -identity -that emerged out of the As many scholars and activists have already observed and critiqued, much of the cultural weight and political heat around identities in the US has had to do with the investment in the very concept of identity. As Riley puts it, "the offer of contemporary identities is more straightforward: self-construction, to achieve a self. In this respect, identity politics lies closer to a sacrificial religion than to a civic ethics." (55) Not only had no conceptual distinction between sexuality and gender emerged, but more significantly, lives were possible through that very non-distinction. 9 The tight conjunction among sex/gender/sexuality has both enabled the work of changing the body to align its gender/sexuality with its sex and has set the parameters within which these changes are imagined and enacted. It has therefore necessarily contributed to a specific structure of selfcognition and narrative presentation among trans persons. The persistent pattern, for instance, of a tight transition from a cross-gender-identified childhood to an adolescence marked by sexual desire for one's own peers (yet another word for which jins stands) speaks to the indistinction between gender/sex/sexuality. This indistinction regularly disrupts attempts -by the state, religious leaders, medical professionals, and trans persons themselves --to separate the homosexual from the trans.
As importantly, some of the conceptual distinctions between gender, sex, and sexuality within the Anglo-American context, including the distinction sometimes made between transgender and transsexual (based on surgical modifications to the body), have been shaped over the past decades by the identity politics of gender and sexuality, as well as queer 9 This is not a cultural relativist proposition. later, it began to be embraced in part for an opposite effect: to distance oneself from that
Persian pejorative assignation and to connect oneself to an imagined global community. As importantly, by the late 1990s, the designation gay had also become a delineating category separating one from transsexual, which had begun to acquire its own distinct recognition.
Gay in today's Iran marks itself as dis-identification from kuni and from trans, its disavowed past and present. pejorative and morally loathed; the other currently available identification, transsexual, did not feel quite right and seemed to be a fad to be resisted. Lesbian allowed her a distinct and satisfying self-cognition. Her partner became lesbian because of her location in relation to her. What work "the import" does in its local context, in relation to the many other concepts and practices that it becomes intertwined with and that inform its meaning in the transplanted space cannot be presumed predictable. As Brad Epps put it, "what is at stake if we … query not simply agency in language but also agency in a particular language, a specific language, … or, indeed, and importantly, between and betwixt specific languages, the very position, so to speak, of any number of subjects, trans or not … who find themselves pulled, often quite painfully but also quite pleasurably, between two or more languages. What, in other words, occurs when two or more languages are understood, both in accordance to the general claims about language, as sites of agency? And what occurs, moreover, when such double (or triple, or multiple) sites, such double (or triple, or multiple) agencies are in conflict?" 13 To say that gay, trans, lesbian, etc. do not mean the same thing everywhere and at all times is far from a novel proposition.
14 But if we recognize that these enunciations may mean differently, and perform a different cultural work, in Tehran compared to New
York, then we need to ask how that difference may affect a different politics of transnational solidarity. What are the implications of recognizing these differentiallysituated meanings of words for building alliances internationally on issues of sexual rights?
Relatedly, I suggest that the different stories about one's sense of being in the world -the specific cultural scripts for/of the self --also matter in terms of what shapes local activism, 13 Brad Epps, unpublished discussant's comments, previously cited. To clarify: I am not suggesting that no one in the "non-West" names him or herself gay or lesbian, but that one of the problems with the current heated debates between proponents of "global gay" and opponents of "gay international" resides in their common presumption that "I am gay" means the same thing anywhere it is pronounced. One may object that the same point could be made about other identifying categories, such as heterosexual, man, woman, etc. I agree. Similar historical sensibilities and ethnographic insights need to be, and have more often been, extended to these categories as well. Without such care, not only do we produce "bad history" and "flat ethnography," our political practices become oblivious to their own potentially adverse effects. we could ask how could we, working with and through our differing languages and styles of practice, connect with the local emergences?
Local languages and styles are complex and continuously shifting, much the same way "there" as "here" -which also means that the point is not to authenticate and fix some at the expense of others. To give an example from the local scene of trans-activism in Tehran, the dominant pattern has not been one of translation of demands for addressing needs into a language of rights. Unlike the language of rights -human rights, sexual rights, etc. -discourse of need satisfaction does not seem to be a self-evidently universal discourse with a common vocabulary and grammar. One would have to necessarily be in conversation with local communities of activists and consider their perception and style of activism, before imagining the possibilities of transnational solidarity work. As far as trans-activism in Tehran is concerned, for instance, given the parameters of the religiolegal acceptability of transsexuality, lobbying for needs in terms of social entitlements, rather than demanding rights, has shaped trans-activism. 15 Activists tended to work in the pattern of engaging in a "small and inconspicuous acquisition of entitlements. Welfare Organization publicly advocating the same. 18 It is through a dynamic of working with and through governmental institutions that trans-activists have initiated, re-shaped, brought their own agenda into play, and simultaneously made themselves into subjects of governmental play.
Moreover, despite their regular engagement with structures of policy and governance, trans-activists frequently and insistently iterate a concern against the "politicization" of their issues. While insisting that they did not wish their cause to become politicized, 
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Unlike the broad shape of women's rights activism, formed around rights and shaped in terms of engagement with or opposition to institutional sites of state power, transactivism (with its need-centered pragmatics) has tended to think of state-focused politics -the fracturous ever-shifting political configurations of who is in charge of which political office -as detrimental to their cause. They have aimed to make sure that their access to such offices as the Welfare Organization, the Ministry of Health, and so on would not be affected by the political markings of the occupants of the office. Whether it is Khatami or Ahmadinijad in office, they need to be able to go to the Presidency.
Whether it was Khomeini or now Khamenei, they need to go to the Supreme Leader.
"Not political" means they want to keep their needs and entitlements guarded from the continuous vagaries of occupants of offices all the way down to ministries, judges, and lower-echelon bureaucrats. They need to be close enough to individuals to get things done, but not too closely identified with any individual.
This contrasting understanding of politics and different orientations vis-à-vis "engagement" is an effect of the legibility of transsexuality and the continued illegibility of the equality paradigm that feminists face within the dominant Islamic discourses differentially impacting their domains of possibility. Trans legibility has made a rightscentered discourse at best unnecessary and, worse, potentially risky, as it would open up transsexual issues to the political vagaries of "the state." While Islamic rulings (e.g., Khomeini's fatwa on permissibility of sexual surgeries) has been enabling for setting the parameters of social cognition and the satisfaction of needs, the Islamic rulings on women, family law, inheritance, exclusion from certain offices, and other numerous levels of discrimination have made the deployment of the rights indispensible for women's rights advocates. The Majlis is seen as the primary seat of laws/rights. As far as trans-activists are concerned, they have already received their badge of citizenship/social cognition in Khomeini's fatwa. Any other parliamentary grand document would pale in contrast. To the extent that regulations need legislation, their orientation from a local to a larger scale has paid off. After all, even if a law is passed, the implementation is back on the local level, where local alliances make it work or fail.
"Not wishing to become politicized" has also impacted trans-activists' skepticism toward the discourse of rights. In addiction to their dismissal of the usefulness of engaging with the legislative, the rights discourse has become entangled within a volatile international scene with which they had engaged for publicity in 2003-04 but towards which they have grown distrustful. This was a scene over which they felt they had no control. While individual trans persons did try to use international engagement to expand their life options (including through asylum and immigration), as a collective body, the activists seemed to have grown increasingly wary of such entanglements.
The success of trans-activists' language and style of self-presentation has also impacted the conversation among self-identified gays and lesbians who, while living in contiguity with the trans communities, distinguish their needs and desires. Undoubtedly, some have sought strength through connections with Iranian diasporic gay and lesbian communities.
Others have begun to look to their trans "neighbors," asking what they could learn from the latter's success. In particular, and in relation to the spread of HIV/AIDS and its association with male same-sex practices, they have begun to ask if a similar discourse of "vulnerability" ["vulnerable to social harm"] as invoked by trans-activists to lobby for needed services and entitlements, could also be used to expand the social and legal room for their communities. As Michael Fischer has noted, "'Vulnerable' is a key cultural term, a legal, moral, theological, psychiatric, psychological, hormonal, medical and surgical 'switching point.' It is a legal term and category that shifts the grounds of debate from internationally defined 'human rights' language to less contested, more local and contextual, languages of welfare, justice and vulnerability. It opens up bureaucratic space using psychiatry as a procedural means of regulation and defense." were not the only people who have been executed on charges of rape. What is called "violent rape" is a capital punishment and generally over the past five years there has been an alarming increase in executions on charges to do with crimes of rape and adultery, most of which concern heterosexual rape and consensual adult sexual relations.
Strictly speaking, no one has been executed on charge of being gay or homosexuality.
Being gay is not criminalized in Iran, nor is there a category named homosexuality in Islamic jurisprudence or law; homosexuality appears primarily in psychiatric medical texts and now increasingly in popular psychology advice books about sexual relations.
What is a capital crime is sodomy between two men. 21 Is the increasing slippage between sodomy and homosexuality, in part through transnational travel of these concepts, helpful to lives of gays in Iran?
22 21 In earlier versions of the penal code, currently under revision, punishment of sodomy appears under the same section as adultery [section titled "adultery and related matters (lavat, tafkhiz and musahiqah {sodomy, intercrural sex, and tribadism})"]. In a later version, adultery has been made into a separate chapter from the other three. and more recently by IRQO) tends to ignore that direct confrontation may not be the only -nor necessarily the most effective -way of creating social room for livable and loving lives in Iran. That singularly focused insistence tends to at best pity men, women, and trans persons who engage in inventive social practices in their daily lives as oppressed, as deprived of real choices or the correct consciousness. The flourishing of an international gay culture and of gay solidarity and human rights movement, and its promissory liberatory possibilities, make a new style of living gay lives as if a necessity, and living otherwise only a sign of internalized self-hatred and socio-legal oppression. The current internet gay discourse is saturated with such moralizing progressist narratives, defining its own homo-normalizing contours against the foil of these "past" and/or oppressive behavior. 25 The other domain in which a growing movement for improvement of rights and decrease of punishments has been under way in Iran is to suspend all cases the sole basis for which is confessions obtained under duress, whether prosecutional pressure or fears of blackmail -usually the case with all consensual "sexual crimes." Because of very strong witness requirements for such infringements of the law, almost impossible to fulfill, the overwhelming evidence presented by prosecutors is confessions. Again, persons under the charge of sodomy are in the same situation, legally speaking, as those with charges of heterosexual adultery. These campaigns, I suggest, would be a lot more life saving than separating one group of adults and naming them gay -a move that Long has argued in some cases may have contributed to worsening their situation.
At issue, then, is not to deny that the increasing self-referential circulation of terms such as gay, lesbian, etc. among Iranians today may indicate a different and emergent conceptual mapping of sexual practices and desires; what is problematical is the privileging of this emergent naming and configuring it as the same globally and as intrinsically superior to other modes of living non-hetero-normative sex/gender lives.
